What to have ready before we start
The access, scope decisions, documents and people to line up before a Baseline Assessment begins, and the one category of data we ask you never to send
On this page — 6 sections
Engagements slip for administrative reasons far more often than technical ones. Access requests sit in a queue, the estate boundary turns out to be contested, or the one person who knows the payment HSM hierarchy is on leave. This page lists what to prepare so that week one is discovery rather than paperwork.
None of it is exotic. Most organisations can assemble the whole list in a fortnight if somebody owns it. Nothing on the list requires a decision about post-quantum cryptography, which is deliberate — the preparation is inventory hygiene, and it retains its value even if you never run an assessment.
The short list
- A named engagement owner
- One person on your side who can settle scope disputes and chase access.
- A written estate boundary
- Which business units, environments and regions are in and out.
- Read-only access
- Repositories, configuration sources, endpoint metadata, certificate inventories.
- Existing inventories
- CMDB export, certificate register, HSM and key inventory, any SBOMs you already produce.
- Four to six subject-matter experts
- People who can answer questions about specific systems within a day.
- A change-control contact
- Somebody who can tell you what a change to a given service actually takes.
- An output destination
- Where the inventory, CBOM and evidence records need to land for your auditors.
Decide the estate boundary first
Scope is the single most common source of delay, and it is a business decision rather than a technical one. Discovery will happily read whatever you point it at, so the question is what you intend to be accountable for at the end.
Write the boundary down before kickoff. A boundary held in three people's heads produces a report that each of them disputes. The shape we ask for is short and prosaic.
Estate boundary — Baseline Assessment
IN SCOPE
Business units: Retail Banking, Payments
Environments: production, pre-production
Regions: IN, SG
Repositories: all repos under the two org-level GitHub groups listed in Annex A
Endpoints: externally reachable TLS endpoints on the two payment domains
Appliances: load balancers and API gateways in the payments path
OUT OF SCOPE
Business units: Wealth (separate programme), Insurance (divesting)
Environments: developer laptops, ephemeral test environments
Systems: the mainframe (assessed separately in Q4)
OPEN QUESTIONS
The acquired card-processing platform — owner to confirm by kickoff.Open questions are fine. Unstated assumptions are not. Anything left open at kickoff gets recorded as a scope exclusion in the report so that a reader in twelve months knows what was never looked at. The asset model behind these boundaries is described in What counts as an asset.
Access, and the least of it that works
Discovery reads declarations and configuration. It does not need production credentials, administrative rights, or the ability to change anything. Ask your security team to provision the narrowest version of each item below.
| What we read | Access level | Why it is needed |
|---|---|---|
| Source repositories | Read-only, per-repository or per-organisation | Cryptographic library calls, algorithm constants, protocol configuration in code |
| Build and dependency manifests | Read-only | Transitive cryptographic dependencies that no application code mentions |
| Configuration management | Read-only export | Cipher suites, protocol versions and key parameters set outside application code |
| TLS endpoint metadata | Network reachability from an agreed source range | Negotiated suites and certificate parameters as actually served |
| Certificate and key inventories | Read-only metadata export, no key material | Algorithm, key length, validity and issuer for each credential |
| Appliance configuration | Exported configuration file | Cryptography in devices that expose no API |
Which detector consumes which input is set out in The detector catalogue. Access requests that will not be approved are worth identifying early, because each one becomes a documented blind spot in the final report rather than a silent omission.
What never to send us
Out of scope
Do not send private keys, key material of any kind, HSM exports containing secrets, production credentials, plaintext customer records, or packet captures. AutoPQC does not need them and we will not accept them. Discovery works on metadata and declarations: algorithm names, key lengths, protocol versions, certificate parameters, configuration values. If an intake process ever appears to ask you for key material, stop and contact us — see What we hold, and what we never take and /security.
The same applies to production data. We do not need a copy of an encrypted database to tell you which algorithm encrypted it. The parameter tells us; the payload adds only risk. Retention and deletion of what we do hold is documented in Retention and deletion, and how it is protected in transit and at rest is in Encryption and key handling.
It is worth telling your security team this explicitly when you raise the access requests. Reviewers who assume a cryptographic assessment needs key material will hold the request, reasonably, until somebody explains that it does not. A one-line statement that the engagement reads metadata and configuration only will usually clear the queue faster than an escalation.
The people, and the hour of their time you will need
Discovery produces questions. A finding that reads as critical in configuration is sometimes a decommissioned path, and only a human knows that. Line up the following before kickoff and give them warning that a question is coming.
- PKI or certificate authority owner — issuance policy, key hierarchy, what is automated and what is manual.
- Network or edge owner — where TLS terminates, and how many hops sit behind each public endpoint.
- Key management or HSM owner — key hierarchy, algorithm constraints, firmware version, upgrade path.
- Two or three application architects — for the services carrying the highest-value data.
- Change management — realistic lead times for a cryptographic change in each environment.
- Internal audit — the evidence format and retention their assessors expect.
Take care with the acquired estate
Recently acquired business units are consistently the worst-documented part of any estate and consistently the highest-scoring. If an acquisition is in scope, name a contact inside it rather than routing questions through group functions, or that section of the report will be thin and you will not know why.
Getting the platform side ready
- 1
Decide the workspace structure
One workspace per assessment, with projects reflecting how you want findings grouped — usually business unit or platform. Changing this after discovery means re-cutting the report. See Workspaces, teams and projects.
- 2
Agree who sees what
Cryptographic inventories are sensitive. Decide before kickoff which roles can see the whole estate and which are scoped to their own systems. See Roles and permissions.
- 3
Connect identity
Single sign-on against your existing provider avoids a standing set of local accounts. Configure it during setup week rather than after the first report circulates. See Single sign-on.
- 4
Route notifications deliberately
Findings landing in a channel nobody owns is the most common cause of a stalled programme. Decide where scoring changes and new findings go, and who acknowledges them. See Where alerts land.
- 5
Confirm the evidence destination
If audit needs records in a specific system, agree the export format at kickoff. Retrofitting an evidence trail is far more work than producing it as you go.
With that in place, week one is spent on discovery instead of provisioning. What the first thirty days look like describes what happens next.
If you are unsure whether a particular system belongs in scope, or whether an access request is worth raising, ask before kickoff. Scoping conversations are free and they save a fortnight.Ask a scoping question